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Time and the migrant Other: European border controls and the temporal 
economics of illegality 
 
The rich world’s borders increasingly seem like a battleground where a new kind of 
‘threat’ is fought back – the so-called ‘illegal migrant’. At Europe’s southern 
frontiers, sea patrols, advanced surveillance machinery and fencing keep migrants out, 
much like at the US, Israeli or Australian borders. Such investments have created a 
dense web of controls that displaces the border both inward and outwards, into the 
borderlands beyond it. This article, building upon recent border studies and 
ethnographies of illegality, explores Europe’s migration controls by focusing on their 
temporal aspects. In the borderlands, it shows, irregular migrants are not only 
subjected to extended periods of waiting, as migrants often are; they also face an 
active usurpation of time by state authorities through serial expulsions and retentions. 
The ways in which migrants’ time is appropriated reveal a complex economics of 
illegality, complementing existing ‘biopolitical’ perspectives on Europe’s borders.  
 
 
In the sweltering days of August 2010, I was visiting the police headquarters in Ceuta, 
a small Spanish enclave on the African side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Behind a 
cluttered desk sat the chief of Ceuta’s police migration bureau, who had a big problem 
on his hands. One block away, irregular sub-Saharan migrants stuck in the enclave 
had staged a loud protest, clamouring for ‘freedom’. Housed in a ‘temporary 
reception center’ (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes, or CETI) at the very 
edge of Ceuta, the migrants had marched on the central square, where they 
congregated in front of the Spanish government delegation. Facing riot police, they 
chanted a mix of Africa, liberté and Shakira’s waka waka – this was the time of the 
soccer World Cup. Most of them were dressed in the CETI’s handout jogging dress, 
their T-shirts torn and twisted into turbans or scribbled upon as makeshift placards. 
‘CETI is a prison’ read one. ‘CETI Guantánamo Libertad’ said another. This is what 
their increasingly desperate protest was about: migrants’ indefinite retention in Ceuta 
at the behest of Spanish police and European politicians. 
The police chief leafed through his files and muttered a reply as I asked about 
any impending crackdown. ‘What they’re doing is perfectly legal, anyone has the 
right to demonstrate,’ he said. As he saw it, they simply had to wait for their turn 
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before being sent on to la península, or the Spanish mainland. ‘In the meantime they 
will stay here, free, with the same freedom as you and I have to move around a 
territory of 19 square kilometers.’ But as I asked him about a recent drop in irregular 
migrants entering the enclave – either over its perimeter fences, smuggled in cars, or 
in inflatable dinghies – the police chief swiftly qualified his notion of freedom. 
‘Ceuta, of course, is in plain language... almost a mousetrap [ratonera], migrants who 
arrive don’t know whether they will leave in 15 days [or whether] they will spend two 
years here, and I don’t think that’s in their interest.’ 
 The protesters’ rendering of the ‘temporary’ reception centre as Guantánamo 
and the police chief’s description of Ceuta as a ‘trap’ highlight in stark fashion the 
central theme of this article – that is, the rising stakes over migrants’ time at Europe’s 
borders. Increasingly, irregular migrants trying to enter EU space – and Ceuta, like its 
sister enclave Melilla, is EU territory – are retained for long periods, whether in the 
facilities for migrant detention springing up across the continent or in the type of 
‘open’ center pioneered in the enclaves. The time delay built into their migratory 
experience provides important insights into Western states’ response to unauthorized 
human mobility, on display from the Arizona desert to Australian coasts and 
European shores. Temporality, it will be argued, has become a multifaceted tool and 
vehicle – even a weapon of sorts – in the ‘fight against illegal migration’. 
 Of course, migrants have always been subjected to waiting and wasted time as 
they move across international borders. From 1892 onwards, European emigrants 
arriving in Ellis Island after weeks at sea endured waits for medical examinations 
while warehoused in bunks, hoping their relatives or ‘sponsors’ would show up and 
finally take them into United States proper.1 Yet mobility in the pre-war years was 
nevertheless relatively smooth in comparison with recent decades. Ever since rich 
states put an end to their labor migration programs around the 1970s, controls have 
toughened to the point of impossibility, at least for certain kinds of travelers. Waiting, 
insecurity and eventual refusal have come to characterize border experiences for those 
without the economic, social and cultural capital needed to deploy ‘flexible 
citizenship’ in a world on the move (Ong 1999).  
This link between cross-border movement and waiting – or, as one review on 
migrant temporalities puts it, the ‘strong relationship between power, the state and 
management of time’ (Griffiths et al 2013:30) – has been noted in studies of 
contemporary migratory regimes. Pijpers (2011), delineating the ‘political economy 
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of waiting’ in European labor migration, has argued that ‘the ensemble of border 
control practices finds expression in the metaphor of the queue’ (2011:431; emphasis 
in original). Yet some foreigners – asylum seekers or those scheduled for deportation, 
for instance – would wish for such a queue, stuck indefinitely as they often are in 
detention centers run by large private corporations. Ceuta’s protest against 
‘Guantánamo’ can thus be linked to a long historical genealogy and a broad 
contemporary field of temporal exclusion in international migration. Yet something 
more sinister was also going on at the Spanish-African border – that is, something 
more than a simple waste or negation of migrants’ time. Pijpers (2011:432) goes on to 
ask: ‘Is waiting just a byproduct of state institutions and bureaucracies or might it be a 
tactic, a management technique that is not outside but fully part of the state, 
struggling as it does to strike a balance between sedentarist and flexible ideologies?’  
This article will give a resounding ‘yes’ to this question, showing how 
waiting-as-technique plays out in extreme fashion among the most ‘undesirable’ of 
mobile people in contemporary Europe – the so-called illegal African migrants at the 
southern EU borders.2 Among them, it will be seen, the authorities engage in an 
active usurpation of time for the purposes of migration control. 
This usurpation – or the threat of it – occurs in different forms across the rich 
world today, as brief comparative examples throughout this article will show. In the 
U.S. ‘Operation Streamline’, irregular migrants are pushed through mass trials and 
deported back to Mexico far from their place of entry. In collectively pleading guilty 
to crossing illegally, they avoid a much steeper punishment – a potentially long 
incarceration. In Australia, meanwhile, asylum seekers arriving by boat are diverted 
to outsourced detention centers in Papua New Guinea and Nauru, where they face 
long and uncertain periods of waiting. In 2014, video footage emerged of Australia’s 
immigration minister exhorting those held there to go home to their war-hit countries 
– or else face a ‘very, very long time’ in detention.3 
Such callous warnings are rare for the simple reason that they open the state to 
human rights challenges, or else risk fomenting protests. Indeed, in Spain politicians 
have largely steered clear of overt references to the logics of retention. Except, that is, 
for a few unguarded moments such as the one I shared with the police chief in Ceuta, 
who went on to explain how migrants were quite simply blocked in order to strangle 
the finances of the ‘mafias’ who brought them there. He illustrated this by positioning 
himself as a hypothetical trafficker: 
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‘If I pick up 100 women in Nigeria to bring them from there and put them 
in Madrid [for prostitution], I have an estimated cost of, I guess, €6,000 
for each one’ in smuggling them into Spain, he said. The women pay 
€3,000 each up front and the rest once they arrive, €300,000 in total; this 
means the smuggler needs to invest the remaining €300,000. ‘If you 
withhold 50 of them in Ceuta and you repatriate another 50, my business 
will be in ruins!’ he exclaimed. ‘I’ve lost, because the poor woman who 
was heading [to the peninsula] can’t pay. I’ve lost €150,000, and you’ve 
withheld the other women here for two years, that’s two years that I have 
immobilized capital, that’s another €150,000 lost.’ 
 
The strategy, then, was to remove Ceuta and Melilla from the smuggling route by 
selectively retaining and deporting migrants. In this policing effort, the time migrants 
spent in the enclaves constituted capital withheld from the presumed smuggling rings. 
However, the ‘mafias’ were not the real target of this strategy, since most sub-Saharan 
migrants – as the police chief was well aware – had arrived in Ceuta through their 
own efforts. For these migrants, retention constituted collective punishment, reducing 
them to indefinite confinement in Ceuta and Melilla. 
 To understand the predicament of the migrants as well as the logics behind 
their confinement, this article will drawn on two interrelated fields: interdisciplinary 
studies of border controls, and recent ethnographies of irregular migration. As a 
consequence, it will move back-and-forth between the temporalities of control and of 
migration – that is, state time and subjective time – in order to highlight their intricate 
entanglements. Based on ‘mobile’ fieldwork across the Spanish-African border over 
14 months in 2010-11, the article will use three scenarios to build a picture of the 
border’s complex ‘geography of time’ (Glennie and Thrift 1996:280), moving from 
the EU’s top-down surveillance vision to the migratory journey and, onwards, to the 
battle over time in the Spanish enclaves.4  
A focus on the materialities of time-spaces of control, it is argued, may 
contribute with new ethnographic frames on migration by combining views from the 
‘top’ of policing and politics with those from ‘below’.5 This involves taking on the 
ethnographic challenge – formulated by Robert Desjarlais and advocated by Willen 
(2007:12) in the field of ‘illegal’ migration – to ‘link the phenomenal and the 
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political’. One way in which migration scholars have powerfully done so already is 
through biopolitics, drawing on the different readings of this concept by Foucault 
(2008) and Agamben (1998; see e.g. Fassin 2001). This article, however, goes down a 
slightly different route in adding an economic element to such existing studies. The 
appropriation and usage of migrants’ time, it will be seen, plays into a larger 
economics of illegality, generating unequal gains and distressing human 
consequences at the rich world’s borders. 
 
The time of control: the border’s landscape of time  
 
At Ceuta’s border, ‘Fortress Europe’ appears as a spectacle of glistening steel. Twin 
six-metre fences undulate through the hills, cleaving the North African hillside in two. 
Bright spotlights, sensors, sentry boxes and cameras are strung out around the 
perimeter. Razor wire adorns the external fence, beyond which await Moroccan 
soldiers, enrolled into Europe’s migration controls thanks to a complex diplomatic 
give-and-take between Rabat, Madrid and Brussels.  
 Like at the US-Mexico divide, monitored by drones and shielded by barriers, 
the borders of Europe increasingly seem like a battleground where a new kind of 
‘threat’ is fought back – the ‘illegal migrant’ (Andreas 2003). The sight of ‘boat 
people’ packed into unseaworthy boats, or of migrants charging across the fences, has 
become a recurring spectacle on European TV screens, despite the statistical 
smallness of any supposed clandestine ‘invasion’ (De Haas 2007). Yet this ‘border 
spectacle’ (De Genova 2012) also encompasses the controls in their own right. Sea 
patrols, satellites and surveillance aircraft now scour the Mediterranean in search for 
migrant boats; high-tech fences keep migrants out of Greece and away from Ceuta 
and Melilla; and new electronic systems link security forces from Mali to Madrid and 
the Warsaw headquarters of the EU’s young border agency, Frontex. Through such 
initiatives, Europe’s external borders increasingly seem to be everywhere yet nowhere 
(Vaughan-Williams 2008): a dense web of controls that displaces the border both 
inward and outwards, throughout European space and into the borderlands beyond it.  
An interdisciplinary literature on this fortification has emerged in recent years, 
often focusing precisely on the spatial arrangements of the EU border. In a recent 
review, Sarah Green (2013:350) has identified a ‘spatial turn’ in European border 
research, evident in the field of migration in concerns with mapping the continent’s 
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‘borderscapes’ (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007), with delineating the proliferation 
of spaces of control (Balibar 1998), or with tracking the border’s ‘deterritorialization’ 
and ‘reterritorialization’ (Walters 2004). Summing up these trends, one contribution 
notes that critical border studies, ‘rather than treating the concept of the border as a 
territorially fixed, static, line (as paradigmatically depicted by Mercator’s map)’, are 
increasingly ‘thinking of it in terms of a series of practices’ (Parker et al 2009:586).  
This focus on the ‘process of bounding’ (Wastl-Walter 2011:2) is not news to 
anthropologists, who have long looked at forms of ‘frontier praxis’ around Europe’s 
borders, to borrow a term from Driessen’s (1992) seminal work in Melilla. Yet when 
it comes to the interdisciplinary debates on migration controls, an increasingly 
dominant task for border forces, one aspect of ‘frontier praxis’ is often left relatively 
unaddressed – the temporality of such controls (Griffiths et al 2013; Khosravi 2014). 
In anthropology, such temporal aspects have been tentatively explored, for instance, 
in works considering the time lags built into US border patrolling (Heyman 1995), the 
‘temporality of everyday risk’ among migrants (Willen 2007:22), and experiences of 
waiting among asylum seekers and immigration detainees (Griffiths 2014; Rotter 
2010). Inspired by such studies, this section will focus on the temporalities of border 
control measures, as well as their entanglement with notions of anticipation, pre-
emption and risk. 
In Ceuta, the Spanish Guardia Civil – in charge of patrolling the fence – 
somewhat surprisingly saw the imposing, EU-funded barrier as a mere ‘obstacle’. To 
one officer, ‘the fence has the function of giving us a few minutes extra in arriving at 
the place [of attempted crossing], it does not dissuade.’ Those few extra minutes were 
of utmost importance for the sentinels at the EU’s southernmost borders. In Ceuta’s 
sister enclave Melilla, beset by desperate entry attempts by sub-Saharan migrants 
hiding in the Moroccan hills, the official aim was for a patrol car to arrive within a 
minute of a sensor detection at the fence. Such rapid detection and deployment was 
key for a simple, unstated reason: to enable removal from the border. If apprehended 
around the fences, migrants were simply sent back informally – and extralegally – 
into the hands of Moroccan forces. The Moroccans in turn expelled migrants to the 
closed Algerian border, from where they often made it back to the enclaves by foot 
over several days.6 In this way, their entry attempts had temporarily been averted. 
To explore Europe’s border controls, several studies have in recent years 
drawn on Virilio’s (1986) notion of ‘dromology’, or the logic of speed (see e.g. Bigo 
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and Guild 2005:1). For Virilio, the quest for speed is intimately linked to 
militarization and the reorganization of territory (Armitage 1999:6) – something that 
was was amply illustrated in the border technology rolled out not just in Ceuta, but 
along the whole external EU border. While the Ceuta fence illustrated the most 
extreme ‘militarized’ logic of speed – a few extra seconds for the guards at the fence, 
culminating in long days on the road for expelled migrants – more abstract temporal 
features were on display elsewhere in Europe’s border control landscape.  
Besides the fortified fences, Spain has been at the vanguard of sea surveillance 
since the installation of an advanced coastal radar system from the late 1990s 
onwards. This ‘life-saving’ system, known as SIVE (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia 
Exterior), aims for near-instant detection and interception of migrant boats. SIVE’s 
aim of early interception has been enthusiastically taken up by Frontex and its 
partners, as I saw at the 2013 European Day for Border Guards in Warsaw. Amid the 
glossy stalls of border agencies and defense contractors, one Frontex officer in front 
of a large touch-screen map showed me, with a quick swipe, how migrant 
interceptions were being instantly uploaded into an interactive interface used by 
Europe’s new national coordination centers for border surveillance. The purpose of 
such ‘near real-time’ sharing, the officer explained, was the same as that of SIVE and 
the fences: early detection of migratory flows in order to ‘adequately and quickly 
respond’ – and thus, he insisted, to ‘save lives’.  
In Warsaw, in short, the quest for time-space compression motivated the large 
investments in new information-sharing systems for the EU frontiers. Real-time 
intelligence, or as close to it as possible, was of the essence.  
This logic is taken to its furthest yet in the ‘European external border 
surveillance system’, or Eurosur, an advanced information-sharing system between 
Frontex and national security forces. The aim of Eurosur is, again, to enhance 
‘reaction capability’ through a smooth process that converts the border into a species 
of information channel communicating up, sideways and down in a chain of signals.  
As one commentator on Eurosur puts it: 
 
[C]ontemporary border control practices do away with the perpetual 
present of vigilance on the border-line and the excruciatingly slow passing 
of time. The key ethical premise, here, is speed, and the possibility of 
projecting controls as quickly as possible at any given point that is 
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considered problematic. Spatiality and temporality, in this perspective, are 
not only problematized in terms of ‘where’ and ‘when’, but also in terms 
of ‘how fast?’ (Jeandesboz 2011:123). 
  
This quest for speed is intimately tied up with the concept of risk. I have discussed 
elsewhere how risk analysis, promoted by Frontex, has not only channelled the 
energies of border forces into the task of controlling migration – it has also facilitated 
the growth of an ‘illegality industry’ around the distribution of migratory risk 
(Andersson 2014). Here, however, it is worth dwelling briefly on the temporal 
modalities – rather than the distributive possibilities – of risk. As scholars such as 
Anthony Giddens have noted, risk is ‘a central tool in the modern endeavor of 
“colonising the future”’ (Selchow 2014:69), which involves seeing ‘the future [as] a 
“territory” to be “occupied”’ (Giddens 1999:5). Applying this to Europe’s migration 
controls, the seas are not only physically occupied by patrols, but they are also 
colonized in a temporal sense thanks to pre-emptive, risk-based action. The key task 
of speedy intervention is to prevent unauthorized movement before a migrant has 
crossed the border. In Eurosur, then, the few extra seconds that allow the Guardia 
Civil’s patrol cars to reach the fences in time to ‘repel’ the migrants has been replaced 
with a much more abstract usage of time, reaching into the ‘prefrontier’ beyond the 
border in order to cut short any intention to cross. 
Noting these developments, Mountz and Hiemstra (2012:467) see borders as 
increasingly mobile in ‘enclosing’ migrant vessels or bodies in anticipation of a 
transgression. However, the effect of early interception, as seen at Ceuta’s fences, is 
simply the deceleration of migratory movements, as Andrijasevic (2010) has also 
noted at the Italian entry port of Lampedusa. Border workers themselves are aware of 
these dynamics, and for that reason frequently present their task as one of channelling 
or slowing down the ‘flow’ rather than blocking it altogether. One Spanish police 
officer, for instance, insisted that ‘you have to leave an escape route’ so as not to 
create a ‘pressure cooker’ at the border. As a consequence of such strategies, migrants 
are speedily diverted, deported or left stranded, only to eventually make it back again 
through the rugged terrains of the ‘prefrontier’, more desperate and destitute than 
ever. 
Looking briefly beyond the European borders, this scenario should sound 
familiar to American audiences – and for good reason. There is a constant give-and-
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take between militarized controls on both sides of the Atlantic, with European states 
often adopting U.S. border innovations. However, geographical and geopolitical 
constraints also lead to important differences (Andreas and Snyder 2000). In the 
States, a land border shared with a single neighboring country allows for faster 
interception and removal, yet also means that many more migrants make it across. By 
contrast, Europe’s maritime southern borders, shared by a multiplicity of E.U. and 
neighboring states, complicate the tasks of joint detection and interception, yet also 
allows for a more effective ‘buffering’ of migrants on the other shore of the 
Mediterranean.  
The intricate interactions between geography and temporality in migration 
controls create what I wish to call, building on Glennie and Thrift (1996), a peculiar 
landscape of time. In the European case, this landscape has a paradoxical quality, as 
seen at the fences: it is both the product of ever higher speeds and connectivity, yet 
also creates a migratory experience characterized by slowness and stasis. In this 
sense, Europe’s ‘fight against illegal migration’ shows how globalization, if 
conceptualized as a reorganization of time and space (Inda and Rosaldo 2002), not 
only involves ‘time-space compression’ à la Harvey (1989) but also a potential 
extenuation of time and stretching of space in certain settings (cf Katz 2004). The 
Euro-African borderlands is such a setting, where migrants endure the physicality of 
border crossings and dwell in liminality for months on end, all the while tapping into 
transnational cash flows, smuggling rackets and mobile technologies. The official 
striving for a ‘virtual’ border has, in short, created the opposite type of border for 
those who traverse it: a postmodern wilderness, to which we will now turn.7  
 
The time of migration: from speed to stasis 
 
On my last leg of fieldwork, sitting on the Dakar-Bamako bus in late 2010, I finally 
met that hotly sought object of study: the departing clandestine migrant. Alpha was 23 
years old and had left his family home in Dakar behind the previous night, he 
explained on a tea stop in western Mali; his mum had made him a sandwich for the 
transcontinental journey ahead. His plan was to cross the desert, reaching Egypt and 
eventually Israel – a new route now that the European ones had closed owing to tough 
controls. ‘I’m not afraid,’ he said coolly, a cigarette dangling out of his mouth, yet his 
resolve faltered briefly as I warned him of the rebels, bandits and deadly stretches of 
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desert on the road ahead.  
We reached Bamako before sunrise. ‘Everyone says this is the crossroads in 
Africa,’ Alpha whispered as we rolled into Sogoniko gare. As the day began, we 
entered a ticket office, asking for trips towards Niger. ‘We have a bus to Agadez but 
no further, after that you use other means of transport,’ we were told with a wink, but 
Alpha wanted none of the deadly Libyan desert. He scrolled over a rasta-colored map 
of Africa on his smartphone, tracing alternative routes via Niger and Benin, ready to 
decide on a whim on his next destination – the road lay open ahead.  
Clandestine routes towards southern Europe have developed in the past two 
decades in a back-and-forth dynamic with tougher controls. Indeed, the parallel 
swipes across digital maps by Alpha in Bamako and by the Frontex officer in Warsaw 
were but a small pointer toward the shared notion of movement among migrants and 
police: the borderlands construed as a smooth space, quickly traversable from A to B. 
To both the border workers and the migrants they targeted, speed was of the essence, 
yet in quite different ways. 
Alpha’s journey recalls the state of ‘being en route’ explored by Coutin (2005) 
on the other side of the Atlantic. Illegality, Coutin suggests, ‘erases presence and 
suspends time’ (2005:196). For her Central American informants, ‘time takes on a 
planar (as well as linear) character, making it possible to move not only from past to 
future but also from one present to another’ – erasing or blurring the presence of 
migrants in the places they traverse (2005:200). For Alpha, too, time was ‘planar’ and 
linear – an arbitrary line across his smartphone map, the time-space horizon still wide 
open. His sense of time seemed suspended, the final destination tantalizingly close 
despite the vast distances and dangers ahead of him.  
The planar time-space of migrants such as Alpha had a rather different 
backstory to that of the border guards. On his mobile, Alpha had stored pictures of his 
father’s humble grocery store, of his mother hanging his clothes to dry before the trip, 
of his sleepy face in bed the day before leaving. ‘You can’t just stay at home, with 
mum and dad, like a boy,’ he said, motivating his decision to leave. His backpack was 
half-full with a change of clothes plus a pair of clean, new shoes in case he would 
catch the flight from Egypt to Israel with false papers. I tried to talk him out of the 
overland route, but half-heartedly – nothing could stop him now. That same morning 
Alpha left Sogoniko gare for Niger, and I never heard from him again, as with so 
many other migrants on the overland trail. 
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For young men such as Alpha, the road promised deliverance from a world of 
extended youth and lack of fulfilment in reeling home economies. Ethnographers 
have documented this hunger for leaving across West Africa, relating it to a sense of 
social death among those who can neither find work nor move. Among Soninké 
villagers in Mali, young immobile men are taunted by women for being ‘stuck like 
glue’ (Jónsson 2008). In the Gambia, their brethren experience a state of nerves as 
they hear the tall tales of success brought back by visiting emigrants (Gaibazzi 
2010:220). The clandestine journey is but an extreme response to the predicament of 
youth in these regions – yet the hope it holds out, migrants such as Alpha eventually 
come to realize, is illusory. On the overland trail, speed soon withers into stasis. 
This was clear just a few steps away from Sogoniko gare where Alpha caught 
his bus. Up a cracked mud lane lay the compound of the association Aracem, or the 
Association of Central African Deportees in Mali, a rare lifeline for deported migrants 
in Bamako. When I visited in January 2011, a group of young men milled about on 
the corner outside, sharing cigarettes, mobiles and the occasional joke. These were 
refoulés (deportees) sent back by Algeria through the desert, where they had been 
caught as supposed ‘illegal migrants’ on their way to Europe. The mood among them 
was sullen, yet Eric, a young Congolese man, was cheerier than most. ‘It was my 
birthday on the 10th but I haven’t been able to celebrate it, no means to do it,’ he said 
in a matter-of-fact way. Eric had paid someone for a fake Malian passport, ‘but they 
ate the money’. Now he slept on the street corner, and was lost for ideas: he might try 
to head to Algeria again, or Mauritania.  
The refoulés of Sogoniko were at the receiving end of a relay race conveying 
unwanted human cargo southwards through the Sahara. The Moroccan security forces 
expelled migrants to the Algerian border; the Algerians trucked them to the desert 
frontier with Mali; from there, the Red Cross ferreted some southwards. However, 
many of Sogoniko’s stranded migrants had not yet crossed the desert – they simply 
lacked money to continue, often after having lost their savings to ‘fees’ levied on 
supposed clandestins (illegal migrants) at border crossings. Others yet sought a 
Malian passport, which would allow them visa-free entry into Algeria. In sum, 
Bamako had by my 2010-11 visit – before the Mali conflict – become a crossroads 
and a dumping ground, a trap or a trampoline, depending on what stage migrants had 
reached on their journey.  
The deportation route constituted the rugged edge of the landscape of time 
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awaiting beyond the external EU border. In this landscape, migrants’ knowledge of 
the lie of the land and its temporal rhythms was key to their success in moving 
forward rather than back. In Morocco, for instance, visits by European officials, the 
need for year-end statistics or the signing of accords with the EU were often enough 
to trigger fresh raids and expulsions. As a result, migrants modified their daily and 
weekly rhythms according to the timings of raids, and they planned ‘attacks’ on the 
fences of Ceuta and Melilla in anticipation of their reinforcement, or in accordance 
with the holidays and Ramadan fasting times that impacted the schedules of Spanish 
and Moroccan forces. For those who failed in this battle of rhythms and terrains, this 
is what remained: a dreary and dusty Bamako street corner, where the days dragged 
on, slow like treacle. 
As for Alpha on his line of flight towards North Africa, ordinary time was 
suspended among the stranded migrants of Bamako. However, for them the lines of 
the journey had already become tangled, twisted and torn. They were stuck in a world 
of endless waiting, smoking cigarette after cigarette to stem hunger or dampen 
anxiety. The misery among the deportees was palpable as the days dragged on, each 
like the next. ‘Bamako, c’est la merde,’ exclaimed one of the street corner men, 
looking out over the mud-cracked lane and shuttered shopfronts. Some were going 
mad in the limbo of the border. ‘Le Mali, remove the ‘i’ and it’s le mal,’ said one such 
migrant, his eyes wild and his voice faltering. Their travels had turned into an 
experience of abject durée, a stretch of time shorn of events, a world where birthdays 
might be recalled only to be instantly forgotten.  
As noted in the introduction, marginalized groups often find themselves 
caught in what Crapanzano (1985) has labeled the ‘paralytic’ time of waiting. 
Khosravi (2014), expanding on this, writes, ‘The ambiguity about the duration of 
waiting generates a sense of uncertainty, shame, depression and anxiety... But waiting 
can be an act too, a strategy of defiance by the migrants.’  
There is, then, a doubleness to waiting. On the one hand, it constitutes an 
imposed state of ‘stuckedness’ (Hage 2009) engendered by pre-emptive controls, in 
which time may appear as ‘sticky’ or ‘suspended’ (Griffiths 2014). On the other, it is 
a biding of time: a tactic, in de Certeau’s (1984) sense, or a technique.8 This 
doubleness – neatly captured in the title of one documentary on clandestine migration 
towards Europe, Waiting for happiness – has been noted by other ethnographers. 
Lucht (2012), like Khosravi, draws on Bourdieu (2000) in exploring how the 
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phenomenological predicament of illegality among Ghanaian migrants in Italy is 
intimately tied up with temporality. To Bourdieu, Lucht reminds us, ‘making people 
wait [...] is an integral part of the exercise of power’. Time exposure, ‘when time is 
either arbitrarily wasted or simply negated, is a form of nontime, a testimony to one’s 
social insignificance… as such, it is time to be killed’ (cited in Lucht 2012:72, 73). 
Lucht’s Ghanaian migrants experienced this ‘nontime’ along the highways outside 
Naples, waiting for employers or buses that never came. In the depths of their despair, 
they nevertheless held onto a notion of ‘darkness before daybreak’, how the darkest 
hour came just before the impending dawn. Their ‘non-time’ could in this way be 
temporarily infused with meaning.  
Beyond the European horizon, similar examples can easily be found. In a 
migrant shelter on the southern Mexican border, for example, I once met Central 
American migrants who waited anxiously – often after having been robbed, like 
Mali’s refoulés, by bandits or border guards – for the chance to head back north 
(Andersson 2005). For them, like for Lucht’s Ghanaians or Bamako’s migrants, 
illegality involved a shift in the experience of temporality, in which long periods of 
eventlessness interacted violently with sudden bouts of ‘frenzied’ time (Griffiths 
2014) owing to police raids, banditry or sudden openings of an exit route. And this 
temporal frame, more often than not, was invested with significance through religion, 
for instance in the humble prayers mumbled over breakfast tortillas in the Mexican 
shelter before migrants left to catch the northbound cargo train. 
For Bamako’s stranded migrants, similarly, time was not yet wholly empty, 
wholly negated. Eric was 23 years old, and had left Congo at the age of 19. ‘If I’m 
lucky, I’ll arrive in Europe when I’m 26,’ he said. He and his friends called 
themselves aventuriers (adventurers), a figure of risk-taking and exploration that has 
emerged across French-speaking West Africa in recent years (Bredeloup 2008). Like 
Eric, most adventurers stretched their migratory projects over several years – 
envisioning arrival in Europe after life-changing journeys through the Sahel, Sahara 
and the Maghreb. Eric aimed for le petit Espagne or ‘small Spain’, meaning Ceuta 
and Melilla. But how to travel north, given that his passport money had been stolen? 
Eric’s daily budget was 300 CFA (60 cents) plus a couple of cigarettes, which he and 
his friends hoarded and exchanged like currency. 
Besides such day-to-day items of exchange, other objects and technologies 
harbored the adventurers’ hopes for onward travel: the internet café with its promise 
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of tips from fellow migrants or information about ways back north; the money 
transfer businesses, where a relative might deposit a small sum for their next leg; their 
mobiles, a vital tool for connectivity and monetary transfers; and the Malian passport, 
which would allow for passage into Algeria. Through these means, the promise of a 
far-ahead future of arrival was retained, however faintly. 
Eric’s rugged optimism reflected what would lie in store for Alpha a few 
months down the errant lines of the overland adventure. Like his street corner friends, 
Eric displayed a great degree patience and planning despite the hardships, pushbacks 
and tangled lines of the journey. His short-term plans might have foiled, yet his 
journey retained its horizon, its promise of future liberation. For those who had made 
it up towards Eric’s dreamed-of destination of ‘little Spain’, however, this horizon 
was beginning to cloud – culminating in the battle over time within the fortified walls 
of the Spanish enclaves. 
 
The battle over time: Ceuta and Melilla 
 
Up in Ceuta’s hills lay the camp, as clandestine migrants called their ‘home’ in the 
enclave. Its residents, largely black Africans, were an exclusive crowd. Having finally 
breached the EU frontier, they thought fortune was smiling at them – yet here they 
would face a state of ‘stuckedness’ every bit as despairing as that of Bamako or their 
home countries. This was so because Spain’s North African enclaves were gaps in the 
border’s landscape of time; that is, liminal spaces with their own, warped temporal 
logics. Yet in these gaps, the times of control and migration would also come to clash 
openly with each other. 
The CETI, where I carried out fieldwork as a volunteer over the summer of 
2010, was run under a mixed management system – the managers and social workers 
were civil servants while the Spanish Red Cross carried out most day-to-day work, 
besides NGOs and private contractors.9 The camp was set out over two levels: office 
buildings upstairs, living quarters downstairs. Unlike in the foreigners’ detention 
centers of the peninsula, the migrants who lived here could come and go before the 
gates closed at night. They slept in eight prefab modules of eight rooms each, eight 
dorm beds to a room: 512 beds in all, yet regularly pushed beyond capacity.  
 The camp was a magnet for the media. When access was granted it was a 
dream come true: here journalists had the possibility to come and interview illegal 
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migrants fresh off their rafts. Documentary-makers, reporters and fact-finding 
delegations kept arriving at the camp gates; cameramen denied access resorted to 
filming the residents through the tall perimeter fence. For these visitors, the camp 
provided just enough of a glimpse of the veiled world of today’s global outcasts.  
 Migrant camps such as the CETIs are not just key stages for the media 
spectacle of illegality; they have also become important sites for studying Europe’s 
border regime, as this article itself is evidence of. Many of these studies take as their 
starting point Agamben’s (1998) assertion of the centrality of the camp for an 
understanding of sovereignty in the contemporary world. The refugee housed in such 
camps, according to Agamben, appears as the ‘ultimate biopolitical subject’ (Owens 
2009:568) governed through a permanent state of exception. However, Tsianos et al 
(2009), drawing on Virilio (1986), have suggested a less static – and less dramatic – 
view of encampment. ‘Rather than stopping the circulation of mobility,’ they argue, 
‘camps reinsert a socially commensurable time in the migrants’ movements. They 
bring illegal and clandestine migration back into society by rendering it visible and 
compatible with a broad regime of temporal control. Decelerated circulation means 
that migration is not regulated through space, but through time’ (2009:8).  
In this view, migrant camps serve as ‘speed boxes’ (Tsianos et al 2009:8) that 
regulate the flow of people according to the fickle needs of the European labor 
market. In Agier’s (2011:47) typology of encampment, the CETIs would be similarly 
classed as ‘sorting centers’ where migrants are pushed through an elaborate process of 
‘flow management’. As ‘sorting centers’ or ‘speed boxes’, however, the CETIs had 
one particularity. In Ceuta, the ‘flow’ had by 2010 been reduced to near-zero. In 
2005, the average stay had been three months; now it was one and a half years. From 
having been springboards, Ceuta and Melilla had become, in the words of police, 
activists and lawyers alike, ratoneras or trampas – traps.  
As a result, a silent day-to-day battle was being waged over time withheld and 
stolen, emptied time, time bought and given, time retrieved for observation, scrutiny 
and care. This waste of time, in turn, was predicated upon migrants’ spatial 
immobility. In Ceuta and Melilla, a regime of interlocking time-spaces, unevenly 
stretched over the enclaves’ tiny territories, seemed to regulate migrants as a 
population while disciplining them as bodies in the biopolitical fashion delineated by 
Foucault (2008) – a point that will be returned to in the conclusion.10 
 16 
 The migrants were not hapless victims of this world, however, but participated 
in its very creation. Ceuta and Melilla were just the most extreme example of the 
imposed waiting that defined the clandestine circuit, as already seen in Bamako. As a 
result, migrants had developed numerous techniques of waiting. Some launched 
protests or else tried to render themselves invisible; others sought to accumulate 
‘good time’ and be rewarded with passage to the peninsula; yet others aimed to 
stretch their time in the enclaves while hoping for deliverance. This multifaceted 
battle over time reached from abstract time-as-capital through the camp’s schedules 
all the way down to the briefest of time slots: the half-second pause in speech before 
migrants revealed their names and nationalities to strangers.  
In daytime, migrants dispersed across Ceuta and Melilla. They loitered in 
parking lots, occasionally waving in drivers in the hope of earning a few cents. I often 
sauntered up, asking questions. ‘What is your name? Where do you come from?’ 
There was usually a pause before the reply, a wavering, a brief silence before a West 
African might utter ‘Somalia’ as their country or ‘Mohamed’ as their name. I soon 
learnt to stop asking about country or name, and to enquire instead about the measure 
of all things in the enclave: ‘How long have you been here?’  
Ceuta itself was a pause to the migrants – a limbo in which they could not 
work nor register with the local authorities, their future in hock to officialdom. Those 
who applied for asylum received ‘yellow cards’ (tarjetas amarillas) that had once 
promised passage to the mainland – but no longer. After Spain’s asylum process had 
been loosened up in 2009, police had decided not to accept the cards as identification 
in port. As a result, the stranded migrants of Ceuta were in a bind: if they sought 
asylum, they might be held indefinitely; if they did not, they faced deportation at any 
time, with Ceuta itself functioning as a virtual open-air detention center enabling 
instant police apprehension. In this context, a new origin country provided one way 
for some migrants to ‘stretch’ their time in the enclave, insuring them against 
immediate deportation to countries with which Spain had a readmissions agreement. 
Yet in the ensuing game of half-truths, the authorities still held the upper hand. For 
good reason, the migrant protesters of 2010 focused their anger on the tarjetas, which 
– like the ‘make-believe documents’ studied by Navaro-Yashin (2007) – held out a 
false promise of release, stirring hope and resentment in equal measure. 
Their protest was far from an anomaly. From offshore Australia to Greece and 
Italy, migrants are launching into increasingly desperate action against indefinite 
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retention, from sewing together their lips to burning down ‘reception’ centers and 
launching hunger strikes. Aware of this tendency, Spain had during its 2004-11 
Socialist years experimented with a more ‘humane’ form of containment in Ceuta and 
Melilla. Here, in waiting for news on their fate, the time-space gap that remained for 
migrants was given a sense of rhythm and purpose by activities within the camp 
gates: workshops, language classes and IT sessions, psychological assistance and 
health checks, sports and excursions. Yet while those who made an effort to 
participate had once been rewarded with an exit to the mainland, this was no longer 
the case in 2010. Instead, the courses that took place in the camps now merely filled – 
or killed – the time of migrants, despite the official insistence on their eventual, 
benevolent ‘integration’ into Spain.  
Indeed, the ‘integration’ work of the camps remained an absurd exercise. How 
could anyone learn Spanish ensconced on a faraway hillside, suspended in time and 
fearful of deportation? How could you integrate while held captive as a collective 
punishment? The enclaves, in their extreme juxtaposition of incompatible goals, 
brought to a head Europe’s contradictory migratory logics on integration and control; 
indeed, Ceuta’s protest was itself a most tangible result of this contradiction. Yet in 
more subtle ways, too, this contradiction played out across the enclaves’ geography of 
time. If the time-space of control stretched from fence to port, camp time itself was 
further subdivided into fields of surveillance, integration and indifference.  
 In Ceuta, the camp layout helped create two distinct but complementary 
rhythms. Upstairs, ‘time discipline’ (Thompson 1967) reigned. Mealtimes at 1pm and 
8pm, enforced by the guards; curfew at night, when everyone had to be in or else be 
registered as absent. In this regimented upstairs time, paperwork gave the impression 
of progress. New arrivals were admonished to keep their documents safely, including 
the protocolo slip listing the camp’s compulsory meetings. A stamp marked 
attendance for each meeting over the residents’ first week: medical screening, 
psychological test, a Spanish class introduction and a presentation on asylum.  
The schedules held out the promise of accumulating ‘good time’ for those who 
played by the rules. This was most visible in the dossier held on each migrant that, 
workers insisted, might help them eventually reach the peninsula. This upstairs time 
regime was a fragile construct, however. Frontline workers complained about the 
arbitrariness of sanctions and the randomness of appointments, with residents made to 
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wait for long times before seeing a state official. The protocolo slips sometimes 
stayed unstamped for weeks. 
If paperwork, clockwork and compulsory meetings at least created a distinct 
upstairs temporality, time downstairs sagged and melted like a surrealist clock. The 
sleeping modules were alternately hot and freezing, with mold stains across the bare 
walls adding to the atmosphere of neglect. Here, in the fleeting, endless present of 
downstairs time – reminiscent of the ‘pragmatics of time’ found by Desjarlais (1994) 
in shelters or the ‘heavy’ time encountered by Goffman (1961) in mental asylums – 
hope took on a phantasmatic quality. Much like the phony promises of upstairs time, 
migrants harbored rosy thoughts of the future once they made it ‘up’ (en haut) to the 
peninsula: they would find work, call friends, move on. Their adventures would then 
finally have been worth the long, painful wait for deliverance.  
In Ceuta, the migratory time-space regime stretched from the minuscule pauses 
in migrants’ speech through the schedules of the camp system and onto the abstract 
economy of time used by the police. If the police ‘stole’ time collectively from 
migrants, the emptied time slots that remained could then be filled with the rituals of 
the camp or dedicated to the information-gathering efforts of the authorities, 
researchers and the media. In this complex geography of time, the ‘illegal’ migrants 
appeared as people without a past or future, stuck in an endless, anxious present, in 
hock to the enclaves’ time-space regime and their own impossible dreams.  
While Europe’s border forces ‘colonized the future’ in sea surveillance, 
Ceuta’s police engaged in a more specific colonization – of migrants’ vital experience 
of time, including their hopefulness or longing. Through various temporal and 
material strategies – thick dossiers, random rewards, potential switches in policy – the 
authorities maintained a faint promise of liberation while minimizing the ‘pressure 
cooker’ effect of indefinite encampment. In this way, Ceuta was but the clearest 
example of how security forces and migrants jointly invested in the deferred hopes of 
the border’s labyrinthine landscape of time, as already seen above among police 
concerned with channelling a migratory trickle through the borderlands.  
In Ceuta, the resulting predicament has echoes with temporalities elsewhere in 
the contemporary world. Guyer (2007) has suggested a temporal shift towards a long-
term time horizon and the ‘evacuation of the near-present’ in US society. For Ceuta’s 
migrants, their immediate future had rather been vacated for them while their past had 
been temporarily disowned. Like for Guyer’s evangelical informants, the far-ahead 
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future of deliverance instead became all the more real; their fate was down to the 
‘grace of God’ they constantly invoked.  
At the same time, migrants used waiting to their own advantage, as a 
conscious technique to stall deportation. They also short-circuited the official usage of 
migratory time-space, as was seen in the 2010 protest. As the din grew ever more 
raucous on Ceuta’s streets, journalists alleged that the protesters had in fact not been 
stranded in Ceuta for long. This might have been true, yet missed the main point – 
that is, how migrants tried to take back their colonized future, rather than recuperate a 
lost past. They did so by challenging the discrete time-spaces afforded migrants in the 
enclave’s landscape of time. By rejecting their containment on a faraway hillside and 
marching on the city center, the protesters challenged the time-space regime by which 
they were rendered as separable, pitiable and researchable. Their protest would 
eventually fail: ‘instigators’ were detained, some of them deported. Yet in a trickle, 
migrants eventually made it out of Ceuta, through luck, cunning or to ease the burden 
on the camp. The battle over time remained, for both sides, unwinnable.  
 
Conclusion: the temporal economics of illegality 
 
This article has highlighted the complex landscape of time jointly created by migrants 
and border guards at Europe’s fringes. The border’s temporal topography here 
emerges as jagged and irregular, split into overlapping areas of control, surveillance 
and (im)mobility that sometimes clash with each other. As has been seen, nestling 
within the full surveillance vision are other temporal manifestations of the border, 
where clandestine migrants are not merely anticipated as a risk but rather put to use 
for localized border control purposes, or left adrift. The frictions, gaps and overlaps 
between the border’s distinct temporalities produce, in sites such as Ceuta’s camp and 
Bamako’s backyards, seemingly arbitrary landscapes of time, in which migrants find 
themselves marooned, looking for an exit sign.  
Their immobility should give researchers – not least anthropologists such as 
myself – pause for thought. Anthropology has traditionally depended not only on a 
‘denial of coevalness’ (Fabian 1983), but also on the relative immobility of research 
subjects. US anthropologists had their Native American reserves; their European 
colleagues had colonized natives. The clandestine migrant at Europe’s fringes may 
not be the exclusive reserve of anthropologists, as seen in the steady stream of other 
 20 
researchers to the enclaves. Yet regardless of their background, scholars can only 
satisfyingly study the clandestine migrants when they remain immobile, when their 
time can be freely taken and used. Captivity, in short, makes the researcher complicit 
with contemporary regimes of migration control. 
Besides the politics of captivity, a temporal perspective may also highlight 
another key feature of contemporary controls: an intricate economics of illegality at 
play in the ‘fight against illegal migration’.  
On a financial level, the quest for time-space compression and for anticipating 
migratory risk has spurred technological innovations and new policing mechanisms, 
bringing more resources to defense companies and border agencies. The time delays 
of encampment, meanwhile, also produce significant economics benefits. In the 
States, the vast, privately run migrant detention estate is proving a lifeline for 
deprived communities (Barry 2011); in Italy, reception centers are run by large 
consortiums under often shady financial arrangements (Cosentino 2014); and in 
Australia, offshore detention is doubly outsourced to poor neighboring states and to 
private contractors (Mountz 2011). In Ceuta, migrants themselves were the first to 
notice the economic gains of encampment, in labeling (as some did) migration a 
‘business’ and their protest a ‘strike’. 
Yet while such financial aspects are important, ‘colonizing the future’ can also 
be its own reward, as was seen in Ceuta. The ‘time capital’ held by migrants – rather 
than their labor power – was in Spain’s crisis-hit summer of 2010 the most valuable 
asset that those stranded within the walls held in the eyes of their hosts. 
It may be worth briefly unpacking the notion of time capital in relation to the 
specific sense of ‘economics of illegality’ proposed here. The point is not to 
downplay either the economic usefulness of irregular migration or the disciplining 
function of camps in preparing migrants for the lowest rungs of the labor market. 
Rather, the aim is to highlight the discrete logics of exchange, consumption and 
production being developed within the smaller, yet increasingly important circuit of 
what I call the ‘illegality industry’ engaged in migration controls (Andersson 2014) – 
and how these logics at times clash with larger labor needs, as in Ceuta in 2010. Seen 
as a form of capital, migrant time was here withheld for a deferred future gain – that 
is, for purposes of deterrence, whether to discourage more arrivals or to produce a 
chilling effect on asylum applications. This abstract ‘capital’ was however also 
constantly transferred across to the ‘real economy’ via the distribution of funds for 
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camp management. Finally, time capital could also be ‘cashed in’ at given moments. 
This occurred in the organization of deportation flights, in which indefinite retention 
allowed for round-ups yielding dozens of co-nationals at a time. It also occurred when 
European governments sought to use mass encampment in broadcasting an 
‘emergency’ at the border, thus bolstering calls for more implication from Brussels.  
A temporal take on the Euro-African borderlands of the kind proposed here, in 
sum, suggests other ways of thinking about migration controls than those offered by 
the biopolitical accounts alluded to earlier in this article. Walters (2011) has asserted 
that we may need to think beyond Foucault’s (biopolitical) ‘toolbox’ to grasp 
contemporary controls, and the appropriation of migrants’ time pushes exactly at this 
limit. Instead of intervening upon migrants’ vital characteristics, as biopolitics does, 
controls of the kind seen in Ceuta extract vitality. Instead of subjectifying or 
subjugating bodies, border guards put them into uneven circulation. In this way, 
Europe’s ‘illegality industry’ usurps (or consumes) migrants’ mobility, and puts it to 
use for its own ends. It deposes or retains their bodies in a show of deterrence. It 
stretches their experience of time, either by keeping them stranded or by slowing 
them down through expulsion or removal from the border. This extractive process – 
this economics of illegality in the broadest sense – helps structure the peculiar 
temporalities experienced by clandestine migrants at the edges of Europe.  
  The industry, then, is also productive – throwing further light on the relation 
between this article’s juxtaposed temporal frames, a coldly calculating ‘time of 
control’ on the one hand and a rugged ‘time of migration’ on the other. To the 
authorities, Ceuta was a trap; to migrants it was a pause. To the police, Bamako 
constituted a buffer, while to migrants it was akin to a swamp, dragging them down. 
Returning to remarks above on time-space under globalization, the possibilities of 
anticipation, interception and deferral opened up by compression and speed have led 
to precisely the opposite reality for those who are targeted: a world of slowness and 
stasis. One mobile assemblage, that of control, feeds off and perpetuates the 
increasing immobility of its necessary Other.  
 However, it is worth complicating this picture. Migration controls are far from 
a unified field – rather, they are ad hoc creations developed in accordance with 
political and media priorities, the constraints of geography and geopolitics, and the 
supple tactics of migrants and smugglers. Moreover, their productivity is always in 
excess to the industry’s needs. When the Melilla border fence was fortified in 2013, 
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new spectacular entry attempts picked up pace. And as retention grew longer in 
Ceuta, new techniques of waiting emerged, in a game of make-believe played out 
with increasingly frustrated officials.  
If the control mechanisms in place from the Sahel to southern Spain can be 
approached as an economics of illegality, then, it is an economics beset by a 
fundamental circularity. For the fight against illegal migration does not just come with 
a steep price tag; it also creates what can be conceptualized as negative externalities, 
in the sense familiar from environmental economics. The controls might have been 
costed and evaluated, but their insidious social, political and human effects are rarely 
taken into consideration. And these ‘side-effects’ constantly threaten to overrun the 
workings of the illegality industry, whether in raucous protests such as those of Ceuta, 
in new techniques of waiting, or in ever-riskier entry attempts. Or to frame these 
dynamics through this article’s temporal lens: the constant deferrals produced by 
border controls incur a ‘debt’ that will eventually have to be repaid at the frontiers of 
Europe.  
Back in 2010, barely a month after the deportation of nine of Ceuta’s protesters 
to Cameroon, some of them had already made it back to the enclave. As hardened 
migrants, they fast-tracked through the borderlands, despite the fences and radars and 
police blocking their path. Their return to the ‘Guantánamo’ they had protested 
against might seem inconceivable. Yet like with the protest itself, the logic of the 
return has to be found in the struggle over migrants’ time – their captive present, their 
past on the road and their imagined future. There was simply no going back for the 
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